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STATEMENT OF ISSUES:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in applying the
doctrine of joint and several liability to
appellant.

2.

Whether the Court's refusal to give certain jury
instructions which attempted to apply the primary
doctrine of assumption of risk to this case which
involved a sporting activity was reversible error.

3.

Whether the court's refusal to give an instruction
offered by the defendant concerning the specific
duty of care of a proprietor to guard against intentional assaults was reversible error.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:

The following statutes bear upon a determination of the
resolution of this action:
A.

Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 209 (old version),
§ 78-27-37, et seq., U.C.A., 1953
(repealed 1986)

B.

Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 199 (new version),
§ 78-27-37, et seq., U.C.A., 1953

Please note that the complete text of the statutes
appear in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE;
This is a tort action by a patron of a public roller

skating

rink

against

the operator

of

the

rink

unidentified patron, for personal injury incurred.

and another,
The action

was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County on
January 25, 1985.
before a jury.

It came to trial on July 28 and 29, 1986,

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff, as explained more fully below, and final judgment was
entered on August 12, 1986.

Defendant made payment of the judg-

ment pursuant to a Writ of Execution served August 15, 1986, and
entered his Notice of Appeal on August 18, 1986.

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff went to the Classic

Skating Center in Orem, Utah, to roller skate with a friend and
the children of her friend.

(Trans., p. 28-29.)

The Classic Skating Center is located in Orem, Utah,
and is a large commercial facility with a skating floor approximately 851 x 1501.

(Trans., pp. 75-76.)

-1-

Plaintiff's

friend,

Mrs.

Inglis,

entered

upon

the

skating floor prior to the plaintiff and saw a teenage boy, never
identified, knock down another woman.

(Trans., pp. 6-7.)

The plaintiff then went onto the roller skating floor
and was trailing 10 feet behind Mrs. Inglis.

(Trans., p. 18.)

Mrs. Inglish testified that this same boy pushed the plaintiff
down.

(Trans., p. 4.)

Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Inglis

admitted she did not actually see the boy make contact with the
plaintiff.
yell

(Trans., p. 24.)

something

However, Mrs. Inglis heard the boy

to the effect that "I got another one" after

making contact with the plaintiff.

(Trans., p. 5.)

tiff never did see the John Doe that struck her.
52.)

The plain-

(Trans., p. 51-

As a result of the fall, Mrs. Stephens suffered injury to

her left wrist.

(Trans., pp. 39-45.)

There was some discrepancy in the testimony about the
number of people present when the incident occurred.

Mrs. Inglis

testified there were approximately 50 people on the floor and 100
people present in the facility.

(Trans., pp. 16-17.)

testified there were a "few hundred".
manager
night.

testified

that

there

(Trans., p. 87.)
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were

Plaintiff

(Trans., p. 48.)

400 patrons

present
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Several

jury

instructions

offered

by

Henderson

and

described more specifically in this Brief and set forth in the
Addendum, were rejected by the Court.

Defendant specifically

stated its exceptions to the rejection of the requested instructions at issue in this appeal.

(Trans., pp. 111, 112.)

The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $17,357.92 and allocated 75% negligence to the unidentified defendant, John Doe, 25% negligence to
the defendant Henderson, and no negligence to the plaintiff.
(R., p. 283.)
The verdict was reduced to judgment on August 12, 1986,
over the objection of Henderson.

(R., pp. 292, 307-308.)

of Execution was issued August 13, 1986.

(R., p. 340.)

A Writ

The Writ

of Execution was served by a constable on Friday, August 15,
1986, at 9:30 p.m.

(R. , p. 344.)

In lieu of having property

seized, the defendant, Mr. Henderson, gave a personal check for
the amount of the judgment, plus costs of service, which was
replaced later by an insurance company check.

(R., p. 345.)

Consequently, defendant Henderson has paid 100% of the judgment,
plus costs totaling $18,182.87, while having only been allocated
25% of the liability.

(R., pp. 349-351.)
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claims that in a sporting activity case the doctrine of assumption of risk remains at issue even though the doctrine has been
merged into the comparative negligence statute.
effect would be to overrule the long-existing
cases

that

assumption

of

risk

is always

Otherwise, the
rule of sporting

a defense.

Second,

appellant claims that the failure of the District Court to give a
specific

instruction

on

duty

of

care

was

reversible

error.

Specifically, the only evidence presented by the plaintiff showed
that the plaintiff was a victim of an intentional assault.

The

Court gave no instruction on the duty of care, but gave a general
instruction on negligence.

Consequently, the jury had no defini-

tive

whether

guideline

to measure

the

duty

of

care

had

been

breached.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT
A.

The Liability Reform Act.
1.

Introduction:

At the close of plaintiff's case at trial, Henderson
made a motion for the court to rule that the doctrine of joint

-6-

and several liability did not apply to this case by virtue of the
provisions of the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (The Act), Laws of
Utah 1986, Chapter 199, which eliminated the legal doctrine of
joint and several liability in Utah,

(Trans., p. 66). The Court

denied the Motion, finding that the Act did not apply to pending
cases.

(Trans., p. 67.)
The Liability Reform Act took effect on April 28, 1986,

three months before the trial of this action.

The Act repealed

and re-enacted, among others, Sections 78-27-38 and 78-27-40,
U.C.A., 1953. Those sections as re-enacted read as follows:

"The fault of a person seeking recovery
shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds
his own. However, no defendant is liable
to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributable to that defendant.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable
to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant. . .
ii

In denying defendant's motion, the lower court stated
that the Act effected a substantive change in law and "should not
be enforced retroactively".

(Trans., p. 67). The court's ruling
-7-

is erroneous for two reasons.

First, the Court could have ap-

plied the Act prospectively, and, second, the Act effected a
procedural and not substantive change in law,

2.

Retroactive vs. Prospective Application:

The district court apparently determined that in order
to apply the Act at all to this case, the court must apply it
retroactively.

Such a conclusion is incorrect since at the time

the Act took effect, no right had vested in plaintiff which would
have required retroactive application of the Act to defeat.
Plaintiff's right to collect pursuant to the doctrine
of joint and several liability obviously does not vest until
judgment is rendered.

Joint and several liability is merely a

doctrine which enables a plaintiff who has recovered judgment to
collect 100% of the judgment from any one of the multiple tortfeasors even though each individual tort-feasor's percentage of
negligence is less than 100%.

Prior to judgment, the plaintiff

does not have any right to collect anything from a defendant.
The doctrine of joint and several liability does not give plaintiff any additional substantive theory by which a judgment may be
recovered.

At best, plaintiff acquired, at the time the cause of

-8-

action accrued, the expectation that if she were awarded a judgment, the doctrine of joint and several liability would allow her
to collect

100% of that judgment from any one of the multiple

tort-feasors.

Such an expectation is not a vested right.

As the

Court stated in Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954):

". . . It is often said that a right is
not 'vested1 unless it is something more
than such a mere expectation as may be
based upon an anticipated continuation of
the present laws." At p. 692.
Plaintiff had only an expectation with respect to the
doctrine of joint and several liability at the time the Act took
effect.

The Act, prospectively

applied, eliminated

joint and

several liability in all cases where the right to collect had not
vested.
Act

Accordingly in this case, prospective application of the

defeats

plaintifffs

expectation

to

collect

her

judgment

jointly and severally against Henderson.
The

case of

Campbell

v. Stagg,

596 P.2d

1037

(Utah

1979) addressed an issue similar to that involved in the present
action.
for

Campbell involved an action by a plaintiff to recover

injuries sustained

September 9, 1973.

in an automobile

accident occurring

on

Plaintifffs complaint was filed February 25,

-9-

1974.

On May 13, 1975 —

after the complaint was filed but

before the trial in October, 1977 —

a statute went into effect

which allowed the calculation of interest on special damages from
the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of
action.

In the judgment in favor of plaintiff, the lower court

allowed interest on plaintiff's special damages pursuant to the
statute.

The defendant appealed, arguing that such was an imper-

missible retroactive application of the statute.
In addressing defendant's

argument, the Court first

referred to the general rule that legislative enactments operate
prospectively rather than retroactively unless expressly declared
otherwise.

The Court then made a distinction between an enact-

ment making substantive changes and one making procedural changes
and stated that the general rule against retroactive application
did not apply to an enactment making a procedural change not
affecting substantive rights.

The Court stated as follows:

"However, we see no need to resort to the
application
of
distinguishing
labels
[i.e., procedural vs. substantive] in
construing [the statute]. We do not view
the statute as operating retroactively.
The statute simply directs the court to
add interest to the amount of damages
found by the jury or the court.
The
statute is prospective in effect, since it
applies to judgments rendered after the
effective date of the act; it does not
-10-

clearly express any retroactive effect to
judgments entered before its effective
date, and therefore has no such effect.
The fact that the time from which interest
should be calculated predates the effective date of the statute does not cause
the statute itself to operate retroactively. Plaintiff's right to interest in this
case was dependent upon the law in effect
at the time the judgment was entered. . .
." At 1042 (Emphasis in original).
Just as plaintifffs right to interest in Campbell was
dependent upon the law in effect at the time the judgment was
entered, application of the doctrine of joint and several liability is dependent upon the law in effect at the time the judgment
is entered and not at the time the cause of action accrued.

The

law in effect at the time judgment was entered in this case
contained

a provision

several liability.

eliminating

the doctrine of joint and

Accordingly, the trial court erred when it

applied the doctrine of joint and several liability to this case.

2.

Substantive vs. Procedural Issues:

The second reason the lower court's ruling was erroneous is that the Act effected not a substantive but a procedural
change.

Therefore, application of the Act is proper even should

the Court view its application as retroactive.

While the general

rule provides that legislation may not be applied retroactively
-11-

in the absence of an express legislative declaration to that
effect, an exception to that rule applies when the legislation
changes only procedural rather than substantive law.

This prin-

ciple was stated by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:

"Plaintiff
argues
that
retrospective
operation of statutes is not favored by
the courts. To be sure, this is the rule
when
retrospective
enforcement
would
modify vested rignts or interests.
A contrary rule applies, however, where a
statute changes only procedural law by
providing a different mode or form of
procedure
for
enforcing
substantive
rights. Such remedial statutes are generally applied retrospectively to accrued or
pending actions to further the legislature's remedial purpose."
Pilcher v.
State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983)
See also State Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998,
1000 (Utah 1982), which held that " [p]rocedural statutes enacted
subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge,
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as
well."
The distinction between substantive and procedural law
has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:

-12-

"Substantive law is defined as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties
and which may give rise to a cause for
action, as distinguished from adjective
law which pertains to and prescribes the
practice and procedure or the legal
machinery by which the substantive law is
determined or made effective." Petty v.
Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589, 593-594
(1948).
In Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa
1985) the Iowa Supreme Court considered

a newly enacted Iowa

statute which eliminated joint and several liability and presented

the same question of application to pending

cases as

here.

In Baldwin the court ruled that the new statute made a

procedural change only and should, therefore, be given retroactive application.

The court stated as follows:

"It is well established that a statute is
presumed to be prospective only unless
expressly made retrospective.
Statutes
which
specifically
affect
substantive
rights are construed to operate prospectively unless legislative intent to the
contrary clearly appears from the express
language or by necessary and unavoidable
implication.
Conversely, if the statute
relates solely to a remedy or procedure,
it is ordinarily applied both prospectively and retrospectively.
We have previously discussed the distinctions between substantive and procedural
law. Substantive law creates, defines and
-13-

regulates rights. Procedural law, on the
other hand, 'is the practice, method,
procedure, or legal machinery by which the
substantive law is enforced or made effective. f

Plaintiff had no vested right in a particular result of this litigation or in
the continuation of the principle of
unlimited joint and several liability. . .
Any interest that these defendants
might have in the continued state of the
law concerning joint and several liability
was not a 'vested1 right entitled to
constitutional protection."
At pp. 491
and 492.
Similarly, the Liability Reform Act made a procedural
and not a substantive change in the law and should be given
retroactive application.

Assuming the Court does not reverse the

judgment entirely on other grounds, this Court should order that
the judgment be properly entered in the amount of 25% of the
total judgment and that the excess paid be refunded, with inter-

B.

Common Law Doctrine and Public Policy:
In the District Court, Henderson requested the court to

hold

that

"should

the jury determine

that

the defendant

is

liable, the doctrine of joint and several liability ought not to
be

applied."

(R. , p.

60.)
-14-

The

trial

court's

denial of

Henderson's request resulted in plaintiff collecting 100% of her
judgment from Henderson when Henderson was found to be only 25%
at fault.

(R., p. 345.)

The court's application of the doctrine

of joint and several liability was contrary to the public policy
and legal doctrine

in Utah at the time of judgment.

The doctrine of joint and several liability, which was
abolished by the legislature in the Liability Reform Actf is not
a statutory but a court-created, common-law doctrine.

See gener-

ally, Groot v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 34 Utah 152, 96 P. 1019
(1908).

Prior to the enactment of the Liability Reform Act, the

only Utah statute which directly related to the doctrine was §
78-27-41(1), U.C.A. (1953), which stated as follows:

"Nothing in [the Comparative
Act shall affect:

Negligence]

(1)
The common-law liability of the
several joint tort-feasors to have judgment recovered, and payment made, from
them individually by the injured person
for the whole injury. . . . "
(Emphasis
added)
This statutory provision did not create the doctrine of joint and
several liability; it merely acknowledged it and stated that the
Comparative Negligence Act was not intended to affect the doctrine as it existed at common law.
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As a court-made, common-law doctrine, joint and several
liability is, as are all rules of the common law, subject to
modification or abrogation by judicial decision.

As stated by

the Court of Appeals of Washington:

"It is generally recognized that when a
rule of law has had its origins in the
common law and is therefore a creation of
the courts, the courts may change or
modify such rule." Irwin v. Coluccio, 648
P.2d 458, 459 (Wash.App. 1582) .
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has stated:

"Just as the common law is court-made law
based upon the circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law
be changed by the court when conditions
and circumstances change. When the reason
for a rule no longer exists, the rule
itself may be changed by the court."
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 880
(Ariz. 1982)
The common-law doctrine of joint and several liability
apparently had its origins in cases where multiple defendants
acted in concert to cause plaintiff's injuries.

"[W]here the defendants acted in concert,
!
the act of one was the act of all,1 and
each was therefore liable for the entire
loss sustained by the plaintiff, even
-16-

though he might have caused only a part of
it. The rule grew out of the common law
concept of the unity of the cause of
action; the jury could not be permitted to
apportion the damages, since there was but
one wrong. . . .
But the common law developed likewise a
distinct and altogether unrelated principle:
a defendant might be liable for
the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though his negligence concurred
or combined with that of another to produce the result. . . . Apparently liability was based upon an instinctive feeling
that defendant was morally responsible for
the result, and the evident impossibility
of dividing the damages."
Prosser,
William L. , Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. L.Rev. 413, 418 and 419
(1936).
Apparently, part of the justification for the doctrine of joint
and several liability was that it acted as a counterbalance to
the harsh common-law doctrine of contributory negligence which
provided that a plaintiff must be totally without negligence to
recover.

See Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978).
Whatever legal justification existed at common law for

the doctrine of joint and several liability, it is clear that
retention of the doctrine is no longer justified.

The absolute

bar of contributory negligence is gone from Utah, eliminating the
justification of joint and several liability.

The time has come

for the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability to be
judicially abolished.
-17-

Judicial abolition of joint and several liability is
supported by court decisions in other states.
Bartlett

v.

New

Mexico

Welding

Supply,

In the case of

Inc., 646

P.2d

579

(N.M.App. 1982) the New Mexico Court addressed the issue whether
joint and several liability ought to be retained in a pure comparative negligence system.

While Utah does not have a pure

comparative negligence system, the rationale of the New Mexico
Court has equal validity in this action.

The Court stated as

follows:

"The retention of joint and several liability ultimately rests on two grounds;
neither ground is defensible.
The first ground is the concept that a
plaintiff's injury is 'indivisible1. . . .
Prosser . . . states that the rule holding
a concurrent tort-feasor for the entire
loss 'grew out of the common-law concept
of the unity of the cause of action; the
jury could not be permitted to apportion
the damages, since there was but one
wrong.' The 'unity' concept, in turn was
based on common law rules of pleading and
joinder. . . . [T]he cases which retained
joint and several liability under relaxed
American rules of joinder and in cases
where causes of injury are concurrent,
rather than concerted:
'seem to consider the question, not
from the standpoint of whether it
is just and reasonable to hold a
person liable for all the damages
-18-

occasioned by a joint tort in which
his individual part may have resulted in little or no damage, but
rather from the viewpoint of the
unity of a cause in the old technical common-law sense.
That as
the tort-feasors committed the tort
together, and a single writ was
brought against them, and they were
sued in a single action and found
guilty, then the damages should be
rendered in a single sum. For, as
the action was a unit and all found
guilty of the same wrong, they must
be equally guilty of the same
amount of wrong. . . . But with
the broadening in modern times of
the legal conceptions regarding
real consistency in the law as
distinguished from mere technicality, the reasoning which appeared
so persuasive to the old English
jurists has lost much, if not all,
of its force.!

Joint and several liability is not to be
retained in our pure comparative negligence system on a theory of one indivisible wrong. The concept of one indivisible wrong, based on common-law technicalities is obsolete, and is not to be applied in comparative negligence cases in
New Mexico. . . .
The second ground is that joint and several liability must be retained in order to
favor plaintiffs; a plaintiff should not
bear the risk of being unable to collect
his judgment. We fail to understand the
argument. Between one plaintiff and one
defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of
the defendant being, insolvent; on what
basis does the risk shift if there are two
-19-

defendants, and one is insolvent?"
584, 585.

At pp.

Similarly, in Brown v. Keill, supra, the Kansas Supreme
Court stated as follows:

"There is nothinq inherently fair about a
defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100%
of the loss, and there is no social policy
that should compel defendants to pay more
than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find
them.
If one of the parties at fault
happens to be a spouse or a governmental
agency, and if by reason of some competing
social policy the plaintiff cannot receive
payment for his injuries from the spouse
or agency, there is no compelling social
policy which requires the co-defendant to
pay more than his fair share of the
loss.
The same is true if one of the
defendants is wealthy and the other is
not. Previously, when the plaintiff had
to be totally without negligence to recover and the defendants had to be merely
negligent to incur an obligation to pay,
an argument could be made which justified
putting the burden of seeking contribution
on the defendants. Such an argument is no
longer compelling because of the purpose
and intent behind the adoption of the
comparative negligence statute."
At p.
874.
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These comments of the New Mexico and Kansas courts take
on

even greater

significance

when

considered

in light of the

recent legislative abolition of the doctrine of joint and several
liability in the Liability Reform Act.
clearly declared
defendant

The Utah Legislature has

that the policy of this state is not to hold

joint tort-feasors jointly and severally liable.

If

the Court does not reverse the entire judgment on other groundsf
this Court should rule consistent with that policy and judicially
abolish the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability
without

regard

to whether

active,

prospective,

the

Liability

substantive

or

Reform Act

procedural.

is retroThis

Court

should reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff only to the extent of 25% of her
damages as found by the trier of factf and should order that the
excess paid by defendant be refunded with interest.

POINT II
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO
INSTRUCT ON ASSUMPTION OF
RISK WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
A.

Basic Concepts.
Roller

skating

has

athletic or sporting activity.
-21-

been

traditionally

considered

an

Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., 619

P.2d 1333 (Or.App. 1980).

The law has long been that those who

participate in sporting activities or as spectators assume the
risk of injury usually associated with such activity.

Hamilton

v_. Salt Lake City Corp., 120 Utah 647, 237 P.2d 841

(1951);

Hatley, supra; Brody v. Westmoor Beach and Blade Club, Inc., 5 24
P.2d 1087 (Colo.App. 1974).
Prior to the adoption of the Comparative Negligence
Act, Section 78-27-37 (Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 209, Section
1), assumption of risk acted as an absolute bar to recovery by a
plaintiff.

However, the term "assumption of risk" was a label

which actually applied to several concepts.
Negligence, Section 276-279 (1971).

See 57 Am.Jur.2d,

The Utah Courts recognized

that assumption of risk may overlap with contributory negligence
conceptually
stances.
(1959).

but may

also stand

alone

Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah
These different

under
2d

certain circum-

268, 342 P.2d

concepts were often referred

primary and secondary assumption of risk.

884

to as

Jacobsen Construction

Company v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980) ;
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P. 2d 1247
(Utah 1977) .
In Jacobsen Construction, supra, this Court held that
the comparative negligence statute included the concept of assumption of risk and stated that assumption risk terminology is
-22-

to be avoided.

This Court explained

the difference between

primary and secondary assumption of risk as follows:

"In its primary sense, it is an alternative
expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, that is, there was
no duty owed or there was no breach of an
existing duty.
In its secondary sense,
assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
to an established breach of duty and as such
is a phase of contributory negligence." At
310.
Jacobsen

Construction

then

correctly

concluded

and

held:

"We thus hold that under our comparative
negligence statute 'assumption of risk1
language is not appropriate to describe the
various concepts previously dealt with under
that terminology but is to be treated, in
its secondary sense, as contributory negligence." At 312 (Emphasis added)
B. Analysis.
In this case, the trial court refused
defendant's requested

instructions numbered

(R., pp. 210, 212, 231 and 237.)
text.

to give the

1, 3, 21, and 26.

See Addendum for complete

The thrust of these instructions was that the jury could

consider the degree of assumption of risk by the plaintiff in
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participating in a sporting activity and convert that assumption
of risk to a comparative negligence determination.

As explained

below, the Court erred in rejecting those instructions to the
prejudice of the defendant because instructions numbers 8 and 34,
as given, required the jury to find that the decision to roller
skate was a negligent act in order to attribute any comparative
negligence to the plaintiff.

A result no jury is likely to ever

find.
Jacobsen Construction, at 310 to 311, appears to reject
the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk
and direct the courts of this state to cease from using that
term.

All assumption of risk is merged into the concept of

comparative negligence.
Unfortunately, the dicta of Jacobsen Construction is
overbroad when applied to a sporting activity case.
results from a risk normally

associated

If an injury

with the sport, the

comparative negligence analysis does not work because a juror
would have to assign some percentage of negligence to the plaintiff

for

the mere

decision

to participate.

The effect of

strictly applying Jacobsen Construction is to overrule the long
time rule of assumption of risk in sporting cases.

-24-

In a skating

case strikingly

similar

to this one,

assumption of risk barred the plaintiff with a comparative negligence statute.

In Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131 (Wash.App.

1986), the Court held that a roller skater could not recover as a
matter of law where the injury was shown to have arisen out of
the usual risk associated with a sporting activity.
could choose to apply that rule to this case.
the trial court was rejection of
assumption of risk and

any

This Court

The error made by

instruction

addressing

ignoring the entire sporting activity

doctrine well established in the law.
The error committed can be demonstrated by the use of
two hypotheticals.

A driver that sees an oncoming train at a

crossing and makes a conscious choice to try and beat the train
through the crossing is voluntarily assuming a risk which is
unreasonable and ought to be judged according to the comparative
negligence principles stated in Jacobsen Construction.

A person

who chooses to play football, however, does not make an unreasonable decision to which comparative negligence may be attached.
Rather, that person is assuming known reasonable risks associated
with participation in football.

-25-

A fact finder, under those

circumstances, should be asked to determine not whether an injured football player was negligent, but whether the injury arose
out of the normal risks associated with the game which were
willingly, but not unreasonably, assumed.
In

Swagger

v.

City

of

Crystal,

379

N.W.2d

183

(Minn.App. 1985), the Court considered the question of assumption
of risk by a spectator injured at a Softball game in the context
of a comparative

negligence

statute.

There, a jury awarded

damages against the city that operated the softball park.

The

trial court granted the City's Motion for Judgment notwithstanding the Verdict.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that pri-

mary assumption of risk survives the enactment of a comparative
negligence statute because, in its primary sense, assumption of
risk is not really a negligence concept.

Rather, it is a deter-

mination that the defendant owed no duty of care originally to
the plaintiff.
The defendant presented at trial evidence that contact
with other skaters was a normal incident of roller skating and
that the plaintiff had experience at roller skating.
pp. 47-48, 84, 105-106.)

(Trans.,

See Ridge, supra.

This Court could retain the concept of primary assumption of risk as an absolute bar under the Comparative Negligence
Statute and rule, as did the Ridge case, that the plaintiff is
-26-

barred.

However, the thrust of the rejected instructions, which

were drafted in light of Jacobsen Construction, is to retain the
concept of primary assumption of risk as a comparative fault
consideration for the jury by converting usual risks to a comparative percentage of fault.

Otherwise, unless this Court retains

primary assumption of risk for sporting cases, no jury will ever,
in a sporting case, find comparative fault on the part of the
plaintiff because that requires a social conclusion that participating in sports is inherently unreasonable.
Because the jury was required to find that the decision
to roller skate by the plaintiff was inherently negligent and
because no jury is likely ever to do that, the defendant was
deprived of the opportunity to have the comparative fault properly assessed.

If the instructions requested had been given, the

jury could have quantified to what extent the plaintiff assumed
the risk of the type of injury which was incurred willingly as
incidental to roller skating.

It is not unreasonable to assume

that the plaintiff could have been assessed at least 50% fault as
that was the conclusion under similar circumstances as a matter
of law by the court in Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., and in Ridge v.
Kladnick, supra.
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In summary, the Court

is requested

to reverse the

judgment based upon the deprivation of the defendant's ability to
have comparative fault considered.

The Court is further request-

ed to clarify how the trial court is to handle primary assumption
of risk
Statute.

in a sporting

case under the Comparative Negligence

That is, determine whether primary assumption of risk

is an absolute bar to liability as with Ridge, or whether it
should have been considered as comparative negligence.
Some

consideration

should

be given

to the Court's

determination of the first point of appeal, namely whether the
Liability Reform Act applies to this case.

Appellant proposes to

the Court that if the Liability Reform Act does apply to this
case, that the error suggested is even more clear.

New Section

78-27-37 talks in terms of "fault" rather than "negligence".
Accordingly, if the new Act applies, the concept of primary
assumption of risk is more easily considered under a fault concept rather than a negligence concept.

Rejected Instructions

Nos. 1 and 26 would have been particularly useful to a jury in
applying a comparative fault concept rather than a comparative
negligence concept because, under these circumstances, the term
"fault" is broad enough to include primary assumption of risk.
See, Comment, "Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence
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System

- Doctrinal, Practical and Policy

Issues", 39 Ohio St.

L.J. 364 (1978).

POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO
INSTRUCT ON THE APPROPRIATE DUTY
OF CARE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff was that of an
intentional assault on the part of the John Doe skater.

A friend

of the plaintiff, who witnessed the incident, testified that the
plaintiff

was

(Trans., p.

deliberately

4.)

She

pushed

further

from

testified

behind

by

John

Doe.

that John Doe, after

knocking down the plaintiff, yelled something to the effect of
"I scored another".

(Trans., pp. 5 and 25.)

This witness testi-

fied that she had seen John Doe knock down another woman moments
before making contact with the plaintiff.

(Trans., p. 6.)

The plaintiff testified that she did not see John Doe
before the
injure her.

incident

nor does she know exactly what he did to

(Trans., pp. 51-52.)

In short, the evidence presented by the plaintiff as to
how she was injured
intentional tort.

established that she was the victim of an

That is, John Doe had deliberately knocked her

down and caused her injury.
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Consequently, at trial, appellant

took the position that the standard of care which applied to the
case was that of guarding against intentional torts*
pp. 67 - 68.)

(Trans.,

Consistent with that argument, appellant offered

defendant's Instruction No. 27, which stated the duty of care of
a proprietor of an amusement facility to guard one patron against
assaults of other patrons.

The Court rejected the proffered

instruction and gave general instructions on negligence which
appellant claims were insufficient.

(R. , p. 238; trans., p.

1 12.)
The law is well settled that the purpose of jury instructions is to fully inform the jury as to the applicable law
in order to enable the jury to fully and fairly resolve the
dispute.

Slkington v. Foustf 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980).

An ex-

amination of the instructions actually given by the Court shows
that no instruction was given on the duty of care which the jury
was to have considered in determining whether the defendant had
been negligent.

Specifically, Instruction No. 8 is the only

instruction which seems to describe negligence to the jury.
p. 251.)

See Addendum.

(R.,

This instruction is only a broad state-

ment of the law of negligence.
The rejection of a specific instruction on duty of care
and the giving of a general instruction on negligence is prejudicial error because it leaves the jury to speculate as to what
-30-

standard the defendant has violated in order to find liability in
the defendant.
A similar issue was analyzed
Inc. , 624 P.2d

215 (Wash. App. 1981).

in Pearce v. Motel 6,
There, the plaintiff

brought an action for a fall in a motel bathroom.

The trial

court rejected a specific instruction requested by the defendant
concerning the duty of care of a motel owner towards patrons.
Instead, the Court gave a general statement of the law of negligence to the jury.

The appellate court held that a defendant is

entitled to an instruction which fully advises the jury of the
exact duty of care which must be found to have been breached in
order to fix liability.

Otherwise, a general charge of negli-

gence has the effect of converting the defendant into a mere
insurer because the jury has no real standard by which it can
judge breach of the duty of care.
The general charge of negligence as given as a result
of rejecting the plaintiff's specific duty of care instruction
was clearly substantial error in this case.

An intentional act

by a patron against another in Utah falls within a specific duty
of care which is different from the general duty associated with
negligence.

In particular, the instruction offered was based

upon Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982).

Gustaveson

held that a duty of care of a bowling alley operator to guard
-31-

against assaults by one patron against another did not extend to
making

the

proorietor

an insurer

of

the

safety

of patrons.

Gustaveson explained that a proprietor must have some cause to
believe that the particular individual committing the tort would
so act.

There, as here, the tortfeasor gave no warning of a

problem until moments before he struck.
Gustaveson was not a new development in Utah law.

In

Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977), this Court considered the
duty of care of a lodge operator to protect a business visitor on
the premises

against a shooting by another business visitor.

This Court stated that the proprietor needed to have notice of
the propensity of a particular individual to assault or other
evidence of a high likelihood of the willful tort occurring.
The error of rejection of Instruction No. 27 is aggravated by the giving of Instruction No. 19 without a duty of care
instruction.

Instruction No. 19, as given, advises the jury that

the duty of care can vary according to circumstances, but no
guidance is given to assist the jury in determining what duty
exists under what circumstances.

(R., p. 262.)

As reflected by

the two cases described immediately above, the duty of care of a
proprietor is not always fixed and may be specific according to
particular circumstances.

For example, in Black v. Nelson, 532

P.2d 212 (Utah 1975), the Court considered an injury to a patron
-32-

upon premises resulting from falling down some stairs. The Court
considered the location of the stairs and the activity of the
plaintiff at the time of the injury.

This Court stated that the

duty of care of a proprietor can vary according to the dangers
reasonably anticipated.
Rejected Instruction No. 27 would have fixed the element of duty for the jury's application in light of the evidence
of the case.

Because the plaintiff presented no evidence as to

the standard of care in comparable facilities and because the
only evidence plaintiff presented was that of an intentional act
on the part of John Doe, a general negligence charge as given by
the Court left the jury without any meaningful guidelines to
consider what duty of care had been breached.

Certainly, the

jury could not perceive that a proprietor of an amusement facility had the specific duty of care reflected in a line of cases
culminating most recently in Gustaveson.
The standard of care propounded by appellant at trial
arising from the evidence that the act was intentional on the
part of John Doe without reasonable warning sufficient to allow
the appellant to prevent the injury was not fully before the jury
for fair consideration.
67-68, 112.)

Timely objection was made.

(Trans., pp.

Consequently, the judgment of the trial court

should be reversed as the record fails to show a breach of the
-33-

correct cuty of care or be remanded for a new trial upon express
instructions of the elements of negligence and the specific duty
of care of the proprietor/defendant in this action.

CONCLUSION
The preceding argument establishes that the judgment of
the District Court should be reversed for several reasons andf at
a minimum, should be reversed in part to reflect that the defendant is liable only for 25% of the judgment.
The doctrine of joint and several liability was not
applicable to this action because the Liability Reform Act could
properly be applied prospectively to the action.

At worst, the

Act adopted a procedural change which did not affect a vested
right and could be retroactively applied.

Further, the common

law doctrine of joint and several liability is contrary to public
policy and this Court should abolish the doctrine without regard
to the nature of the Liability Reform Act.
Case law in effect at the time of trial suggested that
any instruction on assumption of risk should be avoided.

How-

ever, this sporting case appeared to not be anticipated by the
direction of the case law.

Accordingly, this Court could find,

as a matter of law, that the doctrine of primary assumption of
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risk acts as a complete bar to the plaintiff as her injury arose
out of risk

associated

with

the activity.

If the rule of

Jacobsen Construction is literally applied to primary assumption
of riskf

the Court still should have instructed the jury in

accordance

with the long

established

law concerning

sporting

cases.
Finally, this Court could rule, as a matter of law,
that the evidence presented does not show a violation of the
correct duty of care of the defendant.

At least, remand for a

new trial is appropriate so that the jury may be properly instructed on the specific duty of care of the defendant.
The Appellant respectfully requests the Court, for the
reasons stated above, to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk or by the
failure to show any breach of the correct duty of care.

In the

alternative, the Court is requested to reverse the judgment and
order a new trial or to order the return of 75% of the judgment
to the Appellant as the amount in excess of the negligence found
by the jury.

Additionally, should the Court order a new trial,
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the Appellant respectfully requests the Court clarify the proper
application of the doctrine of joint and several liability to
avoid additional appeal.
DATED this 21st day of November, 1986.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

^

GREGORY £S^ANDERS
Attorneys for Appellant
Brent Henderson, d/b/a
Classic Skating Center
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH CQffiTX - " - ^
STATE OF UTAH

JOAN F. STEPHENS,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER,
and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

Civil No. 68,622

We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the
questions submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center negligent?
Yes
2.

X

No

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries?
Yes
3.

/ \

No

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant John Doe nee igent?
Yes
4.

S\

No

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

plaintiff Joan F. Stephens' injuries?
Yes

f\

No

5. At the time and place of the incident in question
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens negligent?
Yes
6.

/\

No

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

her injuries?

Yes
7.

No

/C

Considering all the negligence which caused the

accident at 100 percent, which percentage of that negligence is
attributable:
To Defendant Brent Henderson,
d/b/a Classic Staking Center

yt j£
mJU O

B.

To Defendant John Doe

/ JJ

%

C.

To Plaintiff Joan F. Stephens

0

%

A.

TOTAL

100

%

%

8. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Joan
F. Stephens, for the damages, if any, which she sustained as a
result of the accident?
A.

For special damages

B.

For general damages
TOTAL

DATED AND SIGNED this

r m'y*
$

*

J%3S7. 9*

4CM day of July, 1986.

ODJZ
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JAMES G. CLARK
42 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 375-6092
RAY HARDING IVIE
IVIE & YOUNG
4 8 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 6 72
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-3000
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOAN F. STEPHENS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICT

:

BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

:
:
:

Civil No. 68,622

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before a jury in the court of the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
on the 28th and 29th of July, 1986.

The plaintiff was represented

by counsel James G. Clark and Ray Harding Ivie of IVIE & YOUNG.
The defendant was represented by Gregory J. Sanders of KIPP AND
CHRISTIAN.

After hearing the evidence, the instructions of

the Court, and the argument of counsel, the jury retired to

consider their answers to a Special Verdict.

The jury returned

a Special Verdict as follows:
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the
questions submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center negligent?
Yes
2.

X

No

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries?
Yes
3.

X

No

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant John Doe negligent?
Yes
4.

X

No

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries?
Yes
5.

X

No

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens negligent?
Yes
6.

No

X

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

her injuries?
Yes

No

X

7.

Considering all the negligence which caused the

accident at 100 percent, which percentage of that negligence is
attributable:
A.

8.

To Defendant Brent Henderson,
d/b/a Classic Skating Center

25

%

B.

To Defendant John Doe

75

%

C.

To Plaintiff Joan F. Stephens
TOTAL

0
100

%

What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Joan

F. Stephens, for the damages, if any, which she sustained as a
result of the accident?
A.

For special damages

$

B.

For general damages

$

12,000.00

$

17,357.92

TOTAL

5 ,357 .92

DATED AND SIGNED this 29th day of July, 19 86.

s/

FOREMAN
Now, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of
the plaintiff, Joan F. Stephens, and against the defendant
Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center, for the sum of
Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and 92/100

-1-

($17,357.92), together with interest on special damages of
eight percent (8%) per annum from the date of the occurence of
the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of entry
of judgment, for the sum of Seven Hundred and Forty-Four
Dollars and 95/100 ($744.95), together with her costs of court
to be taxed hereafter.

Said judgment shall bear interest at

the statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) from the date of
judgment until paid.
DATED AND SIGNED this /%<?

day of

d&^^C*.J

/

1986.
BY THE COURT:

CULLEN Y. O^RISTENSEN, Judge
Fourth Judicial District
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Judgment on Special Verdict, with postage
prepaid thereon this X j j y

day of July, 1986, to:

Gregory J. Sanders, Esq.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
6 00 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tele. (801) 375-6092

£j. _ ' .\\'
"~

T

Ray H. Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
48 No. University Ave.
Provo, Utah
84603
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOAN F. STEPHENS,

WRIT OF EXECUTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
ERENT HENDERSON, d/b/a/
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and
JOHN DOE,

:
:

Case No. 68,622
Judge:

C. Y. CHRISTENSEN

Defendants .

TO THE SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, OR TO ANY OTHER PEACE

OFFICE

WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH:
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered by this court
and against

defendants

HENDERSON

and CLASSIC

entitled action on August 12, 1986, in the amount

for
in

Plaintiff

the above-

of

$18,102.87

and said Judgment is not satisfied;
THESE ARE THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaid
judgment together with the cost of this execution, and that you
levy on and sell enough of the unexempted personal property,

or

if enough unexempted personal property cannot be found,

of

the unexemnpted real property of the said

defendants

then

HENDERSON

and CLASSIC to satisify the same with all

legal

costs

accruing

hereon, and this shall be your sufficient warrant for

so

and within sixty days make due returns fore this writ

with

doings in the premises hereon endorsed,

doing,
your

WHEREOF PAIL NOT.

Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this 13th day
of August, 1986.
WILLIAM HUISH, CLERK
/

Deputy Clerk

nbi23l6
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JAMES G. CLARK
42 North University Ave., #1
Provo, Utah 84601
Tele. (801) 375-6092

:•;/!• 3c
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Ray Phillips Ivie
Ray Harding Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
48 No. University Ave.
Provo, Utah
84603
Telephone:

(801) 375-3000

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

JOAN P. STEPHENS,

P R A E C I P E

Plaintiff,
vs .
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a/
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and
JOHN DOE,

Case No. 68,622
Judge:

C. Y. CHRISTENSEN

Defendants .
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF UTAH COUNTY:
By authority of the writ of execution issued in the
entitled action herewith delivered

to

you,

above-

directing

you

satisfy the judgment in said action out of the property
in Utah County, State of

Utah,

belonging

to

to

situate

defendant

Brent

Henderson d/b/a/ Classic Skating Center, herein named,

you

are

hereby requested and directed, as provided by

in

such

cases, to levy upon and sell all the right,
interest of said defendant, in and to

the

statute
title,

following

equity

and

described

property, to wit:
1. The property and contents of Classic Skating
Center at 250 So, State Street, Orem, Utah; including
games, equipment, all rental skates and all cash in
cash registers .
You are directed to remove from the premises all
skates and all money in the cash registers immediately.
2. The real property and all unexempt
property of Brent Henderson located at 1036
West, Orem, Utah.

personal
So. 300

You are further requested and directed to proceed with sale
of said property

as

provided

by

law, when

you

have

taken

possession or control thereof, and this shall be your sufficient
warrant for so doing.
Dated this 13th day of August, 1986.

Jm fflU

ZkWffi G. CLARK, Attorney for
//
Plaintiff Stephens

nbi2317
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LAWS OF UTAH 1973, CHAPTER 209
(OLD VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.)

78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1.

78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negligence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person seeking recovery.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 2.

78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled
to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged
the common liability or more than his prorata share thereof.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 3.

LAWS OF UTAH 1973, CHAPTER 209
(OLD VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.)
cont.
78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor—Determination of relative degrees of fault of joint tort-feasors—"Joint tort-feasor" defined.—(1) A
joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person shall
not be entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose
liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that settlement.
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tort-feasors to
an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution by contribution among them of their common liability, the relative degrees of fault of
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in determining their prorata
shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution
among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for
the whole injury as at common law.
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means one of two or
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against
all or some of them.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 4.

78-27-41. Individual liability of joint tort-feasors, right of indemnity
under law, and contractual right to contribution or indemnity not affected.
—Nothing in this act shall affect :
(1) The common-law liability of the several joint tort-feasors to have
judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the
injured person for the whole injury. However, the recovery of a judgment
by the injured person against one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the
other joint tort-feasors.
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law.
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract or
agreement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 5.

78-27-42. Release of joint tort-feasor—Reduction of injured person's
claim.—A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless
the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors
by the greater of: (1) The amount of the consideration paid for that release; or (2) the amount or proportion by which the release provides that
the total claim shall be reduced.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 6.

78-27-43. Release of joint tort-feasor—Requirements for relief from
liability to make contribution.—(1) A release by the injured person of
one joint tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution
to another joint tort-feasor unless that release :
(a) Is given before the right of the other'tort-feasor to secure a money
judgment for contribution has accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent of the prorata share of the
released tort-feasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all
the other tort-feasors.
nPV»Jo ciQrtf-Ii-v« oT^olT iTMr>Ttr rknlrr i-P flu* I c c u a nf
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THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
LAWS OF UTAH 1986, CHAPTER 199
(NEW VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.)
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
>{
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery,J
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omis-1
sion proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to^
negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a producv
products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
^j
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it Is
-*,
authorized to act as legal representative.
A
.rl
i

History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 1.

78-27-38. Comparative negligence.

J

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by
that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attrib :
utable to that defendant.
!
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.

78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on damages and proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the
jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount
of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable
to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 3.

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of
fault — No contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may
be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of
the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other
person.

THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
LAWS OF UTAH 1986, CHAPTER 199
(NEW VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.)
cont.

78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of
having determined their respective proportions of fault.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 5.

78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants
does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 6.

78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to,
governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 7.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and
prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or
doing what such person under such circumstances would not have
done.

The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act.
The person whose conduct we set up as a standard is

not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the
exceptionally skillful one, but a person of reasonable and
ordinary prudence.

While exceptional caution and skill are to

be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as a
general standard of conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO.

19

You are instructed that inasmuch as the amount of caution used by an
ordinarily prudent person varies in direct proportion to a danger known to be
involved in his undertaking, it follows that in the exercise of ordinary care the
amount of caution required will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and
the surrounding circumstances.

To put it another way, the amount of caution

involved in the exercise of ordinary care and hence required by law increases or
decreases as does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^ /

Contributory negligence will not bar recovery in an
action by any person to recover damages for negligence
resulting in injury to a person, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.

INSTRUCTION NO,

A

participant

in

a

sports

activity

such

as

roller

skating is deemed to accept the dangers involved to the extent
such are or should be obvious.

-C/

Brody v. Westmoor Beach
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974).)

and Blade

Club, Inc., 624 P.2d

1087

INSTRUCTION NO.

By
facility,

the

engaging

in

plaintiff

roller
assumed

skating
the

at

risk

the
of

defendants

unwanted

potentially injurious accidental contacts with other skaters.

!

/I

U

"

Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., 619 P.2d 1333 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)

and

INSTRUCTION NO.

There is a legal principle, commonly referred

to by

the term "assumption of risk", which is as follows:

One

is

said

to

assume

a

risk

when

he

voluntarily

manifests his assent to a dangerous condition or to the creation
or maintenance of a dangerous condition and voluntarily exposes
himself to that danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of
ordinary care would know, that a danger exists in the condition
of the property and voluntarily places himself or remains within
the position of danger.
If you find that Joan Stephens assumed the risks which
were

known

by

her

or

which

should

have

been

known

by

her

concerning the dangers associated with roller skating, she would
be guilty of negligence.

}
i°

JIFU 17.1 (modified); Section 78-27-37, UCA

'

INSTRUCTION NO. Q-'-L
In determining whether the plaintiff was comparatively
negligent, you may consider whether her injuries arose as a
result of the usual risk associated with roller skating which
the plaintiff could reasonably anticipate.

i

!
•0

1/

Section 28-27-37, Utah Code Annotated,1953
Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).

INSTRUCTION NO. 0-

^

Should you determine that the plaintiff was deliberately
knocked down, you are instructed that a roller skating proprietor
has a duty to guard roller skaters against assaults by fellow
roller skaters if the circumstances are such that an ordinarily
prudent person might reasonably

anticipate the danger of such

assaults and knew or should have known of the tendancy of a
fellow skater to assault other patrons of the establishment.

Gustavesson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982).

r
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of November,
1986, four true and correct copies (2 each) of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were mailed to:

James G. Clark
42 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Ray Harding Ivie
Ray Phillips Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Appellant
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